

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

IG/CM Countermeasures Organizational Study Response

FROM:

CIA/IG/CM Organizational Study
Focal Point Officer
4E-70, Headquarters

EXTENSION

NO.

DATE

30 March 1983

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

RECEIVED

FORWARDED

OFFICER'S INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

1. C/PPG

2. DD/PEM

3. DD/SEC

4. D/SEC

Attached is the DDI portion of CIA input to the IG/CM Countermeasures Organizational Study.

This submission completes CIA action on this matter.

The paper will be hand carried to [redacted] office by PPG following your review.

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30 March 1983

25X1 MEMORANDUM FOR: [REDACTED]
 25X1 CIA/IG/CM Organizational Study
 25X1 Focal Point Officer [REDACTED]
 25X1 THRU : [REDACTED]
 Chief, Collection Requirements and
 Evaluation Staff/DDI
 25X1 FROM : [REDACTED]
 Chief, Foreign Intelligence Capabilities
 Group/CRES/DDI
 25X1 SUBJECT : IG/CM Organizational Study Response [REDACTED]

25X1 1. Attached is FICG's response to the IG/CM Organizational
 Study. There are three components within DDI that address space
 collectors. However, only one, OSWR/SSD, has that subject as a
 primary responsibility. A majority of the questions are answered
 from the perspective of that division, the distinctions are
 obvious where all three components are included. [REDACTED]

25X1 [REDACTED]

25X1 Downgrade to CONFIDENTIAL When
 Separated From Attachment


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DDI-2395/83

V. Outline for Countermeasure Organizational Study**V.B.1. Space Collectors****V.B.1.A. Organizational Structure and Responsibilities****V.B.1.A.1. Players**

- The primary component within the DDI analyzing space collectors is the Space Systems Division (SSD) of the Office of Scientific and Weapons Research (OSWR).
- Other components are 1) Offensive Systems Division/Development Programs Branch (OSD/DPB) of OSWR and 2) Foreign Intelligence Capabilities Group of the Collection Requirements and Evaluation Staff.

V.B.1.A.2. Missions**V.B.1.A.3 Authority/Policy**

- Analysis of the space threat to US Systems is directed by the DCI and the Secretary of the Air Force for Space Systems.
- Additional direction comes from the Director, OSWR and the DDI.

V.B.1.A.4. Policy Formation

SSD internal and external analysis is guided by a planning document--a prioritized list of consumers' requirements approved by both the DDI and the DDCI.


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DDI-2395/83

V.B.1.A.5. Organization

Within the Space Systems Division there are three branches:

**V.B.1.A.6. Countermeasures implementation****V.B.1.A.7. Resources**

SSD resources are allocated through normal organizational channels.

V.B.1.A.8. Evaluation

- ° Internal evaluations are made by OSWR and DDI managers to ensure that work relates to the planning document.
- ° Customers provide external evaluations during interviews for updated or modified planning documents.

V.B.1.A.9. Strengths

SSD strength lies in having good direction--capable people are working on the right questions.

V.B.1.A.10 Weaknesses

- ° too few people
- ° need to depend on outside contractors

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DDI-2395/83

V.B.1.A.11 Problem Areas

SSD has limited analyst time and strives not to duplicate other agencies' efforts. They would encourage a greater exchange of organizational plans.

V.B.1.B. Relationships of Agencies

V.B.1.B.1 Operational

SSD coordinates all work published in interagency documents. The majority of its analysis is published in DDI products and is not coordinated beyond ORCON release requirements.

V.B.1.B.2 Provision/exchange of information

SSD participates in several working groups which exchange information and produce joint papers.

V.B.1.B.3 Analysis

SSD encourages analysts to maintain a one-on-one relationship with analysts in other agencies.

V.B.1.B.4 Implementation

SSD encourages the formal and informal relationships described above.

V.B.1.B.5 Strengths and Weaknesses

- ° Interagency relationships occur because of a common interest. There is enough work to go around.
- ° Compartmentation can cause interagency suspicions and parochialism.

V.B.1.B.6 Problem Areas

- ° There are problems with competing priorities within the Intelligence Community for intelligence collection.
- ° Processing raw data takes too long with no guarantee that it will eventually be disseminated.

V.B.1.C. Relationships to other Programs

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DDI-2395/83

V.B.1.C.1 Support

Priorities for SSD analysis are increasing so it is not hurt by competing programs. SSD participates in many joint papers in cooperation with other OSWR programs.

V.B.1.C.2 Overlapping

Within the DDI, where subject areas overlap their emphasis differs--one component will monitor an event while another takes action. Overlapping space-related accounts are not a problem.

V.B.1.C.3 Analysis

Analysis in the DDI components is complementary. The emphasis in analysis changes from one component to the next.

V.B.1.C.4 Strengths and Weaknesses

- ° Interdisciplinary papers are possible with several components approaching the same problem from different directions.
- ° Production can be slow because of multiple inputs and coordination.

V.B.1.C.5 Organizational Aspects of Personnel Acquisitions, Training and Advancement

- ° It is difficult to recruit the right kind of analyst. There is a relatively small group of people with the proper academic background from which to choose. Recruitment is further complicated by the slow process of getting people on board.
- ° Training is primarily OJT because these are few courses which are directly applicable to SSD employees.

V.B.1.E Improvement of Existing Countermeasure Structure

- ° Analysis of space collectors needs a more structured approach, e.g. a national review of topics which should be protected from Soviet technical intelligence. Such an approach would allow directed research in support of national requirements.

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DDI-2395/83

- ° The overriding concerns for analysts should be that policymakers and builders of US systems know and understand the threat. New production vehicles such as video tapes is one way to get the message across. A second way would be to encourage more interagency threat assessments so that the consumers are not overwhelmed by assessments disseminated by multiple agencies.

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DDI-2395/83

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